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I. INTRODUCTION
As in prior years, this year's survey reviews Florida appellate court de-
cisions of potential and immediate interest to business owners and their
counsel. The cases include matters of first impression and decisions that
address conflict between the Florida District Courts of Appeal. In addition,
cases that clarify or expand upon existing principles of law or that appear to
be of special interest or have unusual facts are discussed.
II. AGENCY
A. Authority of Real Estate Closing Agent
Did a real estate closing agent have apparent authority to bind a seller
when the closing agent allowed the buyer to tender the real estate purchase
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price a day late?' In Denton v. Good Way Oil 902 Corp.,2 the Fourth District
Court of Appeal said no.3 Almost two years after the contract was signed,
and having given Good Way Oil 902 Corporation (Buyer) extensions for its
investigations, Mr. Denton (Seller), relying on the "time-is-of-the-essence"
provision in the contract, set a closing date and "warned that the contract
must be fully closed that day."4 The court observed that, "[a] closing agent
generally owes a duty to both contracting parties only to supervise the clos-
ing in a reasonably prudent manner."5 The agent, "ha[ving] only the authori-
ty to conduct the closing," did not have such apparent authority.6 Buyer
pointed to no conduct by Seller that would support a finding of apparent au-
thority.7 In fact, Seller's actions were to the contrary.'
B. Liability of General Contractor's Qualifying Agent
Section 489.119(2) of the Florida Statutes requires general building
contractors to have a "qualifying agent" to supervise construction activities
of the general contractor.9 Mr. Scherer (Qualifying Agent) served in that
capacity for Scherer Construction & Engineering LLC (General Contrac-
tor).'o The Villas Del Verde Homeowners Association (Association) sued
the developer and General Contractor alleging construction defects and busi-
ness code violations and sued Qualifying Agent-who was also a "principal"
in the developer LLC-under section 553.84 of the Florida Statutes, alleging
failure to properly supervise the construction of the community's buildings."
* Associate Professor of Taxation and Business Law, Master of Taxation and Master of
Accounting Programs, H. Wayne Huizenga School of Business and Entrepreneurship, Nova
Southeastern University; B.A., New York University; J.D., New York Law School; LL.M.
(Tax), New York University School of Law; Florida Supreme Court Certified Appellate,
Circuit Civil, and County Court Mediator.
1. Denton v. Good Way Oil 902 Corp., 48 So. 3d 103, 107 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2010).
2. 48 So. 3d 103 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
3. Id. at 108.
4. Id. at 105.
5. Id. at 107.
6. Id. at 108.
7. See Denton, 48 So. 3d at 108.
8. Id.
9. Scherer v. Villas Del Verde Homeowners Ass'n, 55 So. 3d 602, 603 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App.), review denied, 63 So. 3d 751 (Fla. 2011); see also FLA. STAT. § 489.119(2) (2011).
10. Scherer, 55 So. 3d at 602.
11. Id. at 602-03; see also FLA. STAT. § 553.84 (2011). Association sued the developer
and General Contractor, both of which were limited liability companies. Scherer, 55 So. 3d at
602-03. No appearance was made by the LLCs. Id. at 603.
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Section 553.84 provides that a civil action for damages caused by building
code violations may be brought by "'[a]ny person or party, in an individual
capacity or on behalf of a class of persons or parties, damaged."'" 2 Such
person has an action "'against the person or party who committed the viola-
tion.'" 13 The trial court entered ajudgment against Qualifying Agent, indivi-
dually, relying on section 553.84.14 The Second District Court of Appeal
reversed, noting that the Supreme Court of Florida had previously ruled "that
a qualifying agent's failure to perform his statutory duty does not give rise to
a private cause of action against him."15 The Second District Court of Ap-
peal, relying on Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp.,'6 held that even though General
Contractor could do no building without a qualifying agent, Qualifying
Agent's failure to properly supervise the construction "was not a violation of
the building code."' 7 Thus, the appellate court concluded that a private ac-
tion against Qualifying Agent under section 553.84 was not proper, stating
that "today we make explicit what is perhaps implicitly stated in Murthy:
[A] qualifying agent's breach of the duties imposed by chapter 489 does not
give rise to" a building code violation claim under section 553.84 against
such qualifying agent. 18
C. Health Care Facility Arbitration Agreements
Stalley ex rel. Estate of L'Aine v. Transitional Hospitals Corp. of Tam-
pa'9 and Lepisto v. Senior Lifestyle Newport Ltd. Partnership20 involved en-
forcement of arbitration agreements by health care facilities when sued, in
the first case, by the personal representative of the estate of a former patient,
and in the second, by a former resident and his spouse.2' Stalley did not in-
volve a power of attorney, but the hospital patient's (Patient's) spouse
(Spouse) did, as part of the admission process, sign the admission papers.22
The admission papers contained an arbitration of disputes provision, but the
arbitration agreement was separate from the admissions agreement, and the
12. Id. at 603 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 553.84).
13. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 553.84).
14. Id.
15. Scherer, 55 So. 3d at 602.
16. 644 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1994).
17. Scherer, 55 So. 3d at 604.
18. Id. (citing Seabridge, Inc. v. Superior Kitchens, Inc., 672 So. 2d 848, 850 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam)); see FLA. STAT. § 553.84).
19. 44 So. 3d 627 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
20. 36 Fla. L. Weekly D1655 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2011).
21. Id. at D1655; Stalley, 44 So. 3d at 629.
22. Stalley, 44 So. 3d at 629.
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admissions agreement did not incorporate by reference, or even refer to the
arbitration agreement. 23 The personal representative of Patient's estate sued
the hospital (Hospital) and others alleging wrongful death. 24 On motion by
Hospital, the trial court stayed the action and ordered arbitration. 25  The
Second District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded.26 The trial court
"seemed to conclude that one spouse is always the agent of the other as a
matter of law."2 7 "[Hospital] failed to present sufficient evidence to establish
that [Spouse] was acting as [Patient's] agent when she signed the arbitration
agreement or that [Patient] was the intended third-party beneficiary of that
agreement." 28 Spouse did not have express authority to sign the arbitration
agreement. 29 Spouse testified that she had authority to sign to get Patient
admitted, but the Second District Court of Appeal said that the authority to
sign medical consents did not extend to acts not necessary for Patient's
care.30 Since the "optional" arbitration agreement was not necessary for
treatment, Spouse's right to sign Patient into the hospital was not tantamount
to the authority to "waive[] some of [Patient's] constitutional rights."31 Nor
did Spouse have apparent authority, as there was no conduct on the part of
Patient that gave rise to apparent authority.32 Hospital argued that Patient's
inaction-that is, his failure to disaffirm Spouse's authority-rather than any
actual representation by Patient, "functioned as a representation" of Spouse's
authority.33 The Second District Court of Appeal rejected this argument.34
Hospital's estoppel and ratification arguments were also rejected by the ap-
pellate court, as was its third-party beneficiary argument.35 The court distin-
guished Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Graham ex rel. Estate of Linton36 where
the arbitration clause was part of the residency agreement, since the nursing
home resident "had accepted the benefits of the residency and the services
provided and so was the intended third-party beneficiary of that entire
agreement."37
23. Id. at 632-33.
24. Id. at 629.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 633.
27. Stalley, 44 So. 3d at 632.
28. Id. at 633.
29. Id. at 630.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Stalley, 44 So. 3d at 630-31.
33. Id. at 631.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 631-33.
36. 953 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
37. Stalley, 44 So. 3d at 633 (citing Alterra Healthcare Corp., 953 So. 2d at 579).
392011]
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In Lepisto, the spouse had been given a power of attorney by her hus-
band prior to his admission as a resident.38 However, the appellate court
concluded that what the spouse signed was a document regarding her own
financial responsibility with respect to her husband's nursing home admis-
sion.3 1 She did not sign the admission agreement that contained the arbitra-
tion agreement as her husband's representative, nor did her husband sign the
agreement.'
III. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Third-Party Beneficiary Bound by Arbitration Clause
In Lion Gables Realty Ltd. v. Randall Mechanical, Inc.,41 the Fifth
District Court of Appeal addressed two issues; the first, being whether or not
the entity against whom arbitration was sought was a third-party beneficiary
of the arbitration agreement, and the second, being one of waiver by the mo-
vant of its arbitration claim. 42 The district court held that the status of a per-
son as an intended beneficiary of an arbitration agreement is a "threshold
issue" to be decided by the trial court.43 For a third party to be bound by a
contract containing an arbitration provision, it must be shown "'that the par-
ties clearly express, or the contract itself expresses, an intent to primarily and
directly benefit [a] third party.'" If such a showing can be made, then the
third-party beneficiary will be bound by the contract arbitration provision.45
38. Lepisto v. Senior Lifestyle Newport Ltd. P'ship, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D1655, D1655
(4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2011). The Fourth District Court of Appeal discussed Stalley but
noted that the facts were distinguishable because in Stalley, the spouse did not have a power of
attorney. Id. at D1656. In any case, the outcome in both cases was "no arbitration." Id. at
D1657; Stalley, 44 So. 3d at 633.
39. Lepisto, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at D1656.
40. Id. at DI655.
41. 65 So. 3d 1098 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam).
42. Id. at 1099 (citing Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999)).
43. Id. Since the first prong of the three-prong test under Seifert requires that the court
find that there is a valid agreement between the parties before the court can compel the parties
to arbitrate, there must first be a finding that the parties agreed to arbitrate, which, when there
is a non-party to the contract involved, requires a determination that the non-party is a third
party beneficiary of the arbitration agreement. Id. at 1099-1100 (citing Seifert, 750 So. 2d at
636; Infinity Design Builders, Inc. v. Hutchinson, 964 So. 2d 752, 755 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2007); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Rd. Rock, Inc., 920 So. 2d 201, 203 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2006)).
44. Id. at 1099 (quoting Technical Aid Corp. v. Tomaso, 814 So. 2d 1259, 1261 (Fla.5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
45. Lions Gables Realty Ltd., 65 So. 3d at 1099 (citing Technical Aid Corp., 814 So. 2d
at 1261).
[Vol. 3640
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss1/3
FLORIDA LAWAFFECTING BUSINESS OWNERS
With respect to the waiver issue, the Fifth District Court of Appeal noted that
the second, third, and fourth districts, as well as the fifth district, have "con-
sistently" held that participation, "before moving to compel arbitration," in
discovery related to the merits of the case constitutes a waiver of arbitration
rights.46 In this case, one of the parties seeking arbitration had sent out two
notices to produce copies.4 ' The appellate court noted that "[e]ven if con-
ducting a minimal amount of merits discovery would be insufficient to waive
a contractual right to arbitrate, we do not view these discovery requests as
minimal."48 The Fifth District Court of Appeal then held that "[t]he law in
Florida is clear that a party's participation in merits discovery constitutes a
waiver of arbitration."4 9
46. Id. at 1100 (citing Gordon v. Shield, 41 So. 3d 931, 933 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2010); Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C. v. McLeod ex rel. Estate of McLeod, 15 So. 3d 682, 688
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Olsen Electric Co. v. Winter Park Redevelopment Agency, 987
So. 2d 178, 179 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Marks ex rel. Estate of Orlanis v. Oakwood
Terrace Skilled Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., 971 So. 2d 811, 812 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007)).
47. Id. at I 101.
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing Gordon, 41 So. 3d at 933; Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C., 15 So. 3d at 694;
Olsen Electric Co., 987 So. 2d at 179; Marks ex rel. Estate of Orlanis, 971 So. 2d at 812); see
Barbara Landau, 2008-2009 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners, 34 NOVA L.
REV. 71, 75-78 (2009) [hereinafter Landau, 2008-2009 Survey of Florida Law Affecting
Business Owners] (discussing Green Tree Servicing, L.L. C, 15 So. 3d at 682); DFC Homes of
Fla. v. Lawrence, 8 So. 3d 1281, 1282-84 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009). Is any amount of
merits related discovery participation "inconsistent" with seeking arbitration under the "totali-
ty of the circumstances" test? In Green Tree Servicing, LLC, the Second District Court of
Appeal held that participation in merits related discovery "is generally inconsistent with arbi-
tration" and "considered under the totality of the circumstances-will generally be sufficient
to support a finding of a waiver of a party's right to arbitration." Green Tree Servicing,
L.L.C., 15 So. 3d at 694. In Green Tree Servicing, LLC, the discovery occurred after Green
Tree Servicing, LLC filed the motion to compel arbitration, but before the motion was heard.
See id. at 686. The Second District Court of Appeal held that "[e]ven where a party has filed a
timely motion to compel arbitration," that party may still waive its claim to arbitration by
acting in a manner that is inconsistent with that claim. Landau, 2008-2009 Survey of Florida
Law Affecting Business Owners, supra note 49, at 76 (citing Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C., 15
So. 3d at 688); Sitarik v. JFK Med. Ctr. Ltd. P'ships, 11 So. 3d 973, 974 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2009). In Lawrence, the court discussed the distinction between participating in court
proceedings after the demand has been made for arbitration rather than before, but in finding
no waiver, the court noted that the participation was "limited." Lawrence, 8 So. 3d at 1283
(citing Phillips v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 685 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1996). The Fifth District Court of Appeal in Lion Gables Realty Ltd. cited Gordon, as "re-
cognizing that propounding discovery would waive [the] right to arbitrate." Lion Gables
Realty Ltd., 65 So. 3d at 1100 (citing Gordon, 41 So. 3d at 933). However, Gordon involved
mandatory pre-suit proceedings in an action alleging medical malpractice, and in that case, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal found that the doctor's participation in pre-suit proceedings
2011] 41
7
Landau: 2010-2011 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
B. Enforcing Arbitration in Another State
Two clients and two LLCs (Plaintiffs) in Mintz & Fraade, P.C. v. Beta
Drywall Acquisition, LLCso sued their former attorneys (two New York law-
yers and their professional corporation) alleging malpractice.5 ' The New
York law firm asked the Florida trial court to order arbitration in New York
under the arbitration clause contained in the law firm's retainer agreement
with Plaintiffs. 52 The trial court declined to do so.53  The Fourth District
Court of Appeal did not agree that the trial court lacked the power to "com-
pel arbitration in another state" in this case. 54 The fourth district quoted Da-
mora v. Stresscon International, Inc.55 where the Supreme Court of Florida
held that "'[a]n agreement to arbitrate future disputes in another jurisdiction
is outside the authority of the Florida Arbitration Code . . . and . . . renders
the agreement to arbitrate voidable at the instance of either party."' 56 How-
ever, a Florida court can compel arbitration in another jurisdiction under the
Federal Arbitration Act if the underlying transactions involve interstate
commerce. 7 The Fourth District Court of Appeal found that the matter in-
volved interstate commerce, as the parties consisted of an Arizona resident
plaintiff, Florida corporations, New York defendants, and a New York plain-
tiff-involving the creation of a Florida corporation and the acquisition by it
of another Florida corporation, and retainer agreement.58
In addition, Plaintiffs in Mintz & Fraade, P.C. argued that the mandato-
ry fee arbitration provision was against the "'strong public policy of Flori-
mandated by statute did not constitute a waiver of the doctor's right to arbitration. Gordon, 41
So. 3d at 933-34.
50. 59 So. 3d 1173 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011). Earlier proceedings in this case were
reported in Landau, 2008-2009 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners, supra note
49, at 125 (discussing Beta Drywall Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Mintz & Fraade, P.C., 9 So. 3d
651, 652-53 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 22 So. 3d 538 (Fla. 2009)). Those pro-
ceedings challenged the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the New York law-
yers. Beta Drywall Acquisition, L.L.C., 9 So. 3d at 652. The Fourth District Court of Appeal
held that the trial court erred when it dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
51. Mintz & Fraade, P.C., 59 So. 3d at 1174.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1174-75.
54. Id. at 1175-76.
55. 324 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1975).
56. Mintz & Fraade, P.C., 59 So. 3d at 1175 (alteration in original) (quoting Damora,
324 So. 2d at 82).
57. Id. (citing Default Proof Credit Card Sys., Inc. v. Friedland, 992 So. 2d 442, 444-45
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
58. Id. at 1175-76.
42 [Vol. 36
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da."' 59 The district court acknowledged that special requirements are im-
posed by rules of the Florida Bar when it comes to enforcing arbitration
agreements regarding legal fee disputes, but concluded that New York's
rules are similar to Florida's and held that the agreement was enforceable.
IV. ATTORNEYS' FEES
Mr. Mady (Lessee) exhausted all of the non-judicial procedures re-
quired by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Im-
provement Act (MMWA)-a condition precedent to bringing suit against
DaimlerChrysler Corporation (Manufacturer)-and then sued Manufacturer
under the MMWA, 6' alleging breach of warranty.62 Manufacturer made a
first and then a second offer of judgment to Lessee, "pursuant to section
768.79 [of the Florida Statutes] and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442"
in the amount of $8500. Lessee accepted the second offer, the terms of
which provided for the payment to Lessee of $8500 but did not include attor-
neys' fees, did not include an admission by Manufacturer of liability, did
"acknowledge[] that [Lessee] might seek attorneys' fees," did require that
Lessee sign a release, and stated that the lawsuit be dismissed with preju-
dice. 4 Approximately six months later, Lessee asked the trial court for an
award of costs as well as attorneys' fees.65 The trial court denied the request
finding that Lessee had not met the "finally prevailed" test under the
MMWA, and Lessee appealed.66 In 2008, the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal, in Mady v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (Mady If affirmed the trial court's
decision, but certified to the Supreme Court of Florida conflict between its
decision and Dufresne v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,68 decided in 2008 by the
Second District Court of Appeal.69 The question before the Supreme Court
of Florida was whether or not
59. Id. at 1176 (quoting Friedland, 992 So. 2d at 444).
60. Id.
61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2006).
62. Mady v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (Mady II), 59 So. 3d 1129, 1130-31, 1133 (Fla.
2011).
63. Id. at 1130-31; FLA. STAT. § 768.79(2) (2011); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442.
64. Mady II, 59 So. 3d at 1131.
65. Id.
66. Id. (alteration in original).
67. 976 So. 2d 1212, 1216 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008), quashed by 59 So. 3d 1129
(Fla. 2011).
68. 975 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
69. Mady II, 59 So. 3d at 1130.
432011]
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[a] consumer who has exhausted all non-judicial [pre-litigation
conditions of the MMWA and then] secures a favorable formal
settlement offer of judgment from a defendant which is accepted in
a Florida legal action filed under the MMWA . . . 'finally prevails'
[under the MMWA and thus] may be entitled to . . . costs [and]
fees under the MMWA.70
Thus far, the Fourth District Court of Appeal said no," the Second District
Court of Appeal said yes,7 2 and shortly after the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal's decision in Mady I, the Third District Court of Appeal, in San Martin
v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,7 3 "aligned itself with the [s]econd [d]istrict." 74
Siding with the second district-and the third district-the Supreme Court of
Florida held that for the purposes of the MMWA, an accepted offer of judg-
ment "is the 'functional equivalent of a consent decree"' and "bears the im-
primatur of the court."7 1 Justice Canady dissented and would have denied
attorneys fees under the MMWA.76
V. BUSINESS ENTITIES AND AGREEMENTS
Mr. Berlin and Mr. Pecora each owned a fifty percent interest in several
entities, which the Third District Court of Appeal referred to as the "Signa-
ture Entities," which included Grand Partners, Inc. 7 They had entered into a
distribution agreement that, among other things, gave the survivor a preemp-
tive option-a right of first refusal-to purchase the assets of the Signature
Entities, if the personal representative of the decedent's estate found a buyer
with respect to any assets of the entities, or the shares or partnership interests
of the decedent.78 Also, if the survivor found a buyer, the personal represent-
ative of the decedent's estate would have a right of first refusal.79 Mr. Berlin
70. Id. at 1131.
71. Mady 1, 976 So. 2d at 1215.
72. Dufresne, 975 So. 2d at 557.
73. 983 So. 2d 620, 625 (Ha. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
74. Mady II, 59 So. 3d at 1131.
75. Id. at 1133-34. How would the Supreme Court of Florida have ruled, had the parties,
without resort to the offer of judgment procedure with the court retaining jurisdiction, merely
settled the dispute and dismissed the action-a situation not before the court? The court did
note a distinction between the offer of judgment situation with the court retaining jurisdiction,
on the one hand, and a settlement by the parties prior to the filing suit, on the other. Id. at
1133.
76. Id. at 1137 (Canady, J., dissenting).
77. Pecora v. Berlin, 62 So. 3d 28, 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
78. Id. at 31.
79. Id.
44 [Vol. 36
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and Mr. Pecora "died on the same day, within hours of each other," and al-
though the opinion does not state who died first, Mrs. Pecora, "as the surviv-
ing spouse of Mr. Pecora, became the owner" of his ownership interest in the
Signature Entities.o Mr. Berlin's ownership interests passed to his estate,
and his personal representative requested that a receiver be appointed to dis-
pose of the Signature Entities' assets and dissolve the entities.8 ' Eventually,
after one receiver had been appointed to replace several temporary receivers
to manage and sell the assets of the Signature Entities, Mrs. Pecora asserted
the right of first refusal set out in the distribution agreement when that re-
ceiver sought to sell Signature Grand.82 Mrs. Pecora had already lost on a
similar claim with respect to Signature Gardens Ltd., the trial court holding
that she did not have a right of first refusal under the circumstances pre-
sented, and she had not appealed any of the orders related to that ruling.83
The receiver opposed her present claim to a right of first refusal, moved for
summary judgment, and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of the receiver, again ruling that Mrs. Pecora did not have a right of first re-
fusal with respect to a sale by a receiver.m The issue presented to the court
was whether the right of first refusal as set out in the distribution agreement
remained effective in the face of a court-supervised sale by a court appointed
receiver.85 Describing the issue as one of first impression in Florida, the
Third District Court of Appeal, after citing numerous analogous cases in
other jurisdictions, decided that the right of first refusal did not apply. 86 "The
plain language of the Distribution Agreement compels a conclusion that the
right of first refusal does not apply in a dissolution action where the court-
appointed receiver is procuring the sale of corporate assets. The receiver, not
the survivor or the personal representative, is the procuring party . . . ."8 If
the parties wanted the right of first refusal to apply in the event of a dissolu-
tion of the corporation or to other involuntary proceedings, or where a third
party has found a buyer, the "[a]greement could have so provided."
80. Id. at 29, 34.
81. See id. at 29.
82. Pecora, 62 So. 3d at 29-30.
83. See id. at 30.
84. Id. at 31.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 31-35 (citations omitted).
87. Pecora, 62 So. 3d at 35.
88. Id.
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VI. CONTRACTS
A. Election of Remedies
Mr. Pakalski (Seller) and CFC Pasadena Golf, LLC (Buyer) entered into
a real estate contract." The "preprinted form" contract provided that Buyer
was to make a pre-closing first deposit of $5000 plus-as provided in a sec-
tion for additional terms-another deposit of $150,000.90 The additional
terms section described the $150,000 payment as a nonrefundable additional
deposit that was to be immediately released to Seller.91 After having made
both deposits, Buyer breached the contract.9 2 The contract provided that in
the event of breach by Buyer, Seller had the option of collecting and retain-
ing all deposits, "as liquidated damages," or could sue for specific perfor-
mance. 93 Seller, having left the original $5000 of the deposit in escrow, sued
Buyer for specific performance. 94 Buyer sought dismissal of the action, and
the trial court dismissed the action, with prejudice, agreeing with Buyer that
Seller's retention of the $150,000 deposit amounted to an election of reme-
dies that prevented Seller's suit for specific performance.9' Seller appealed,
and the Second District Court of Appeal, relying on Bilow v. Benoit,96 re-
versed and remanded. 97 Seller did not make an election to waive its right to
specific performance "simply by accepting and retaining the [$150,000 addi-
tional] deposit as contemplated in the provision added to ... the parties' con-
tract."98
In Plumbing Service Co. v. Progressive Plumbing, Inc.,99 another elec-
tion of remedies case, The Plumbing Service Company (Sub-subcontractor)
sued Progressive Plumbing, Incorporated, (Subcontractor), alleging that Sub-
contractor prevented Sub-subcontractor from completing work on a condo-
minium project, allowing Sub-subcontractor to finish only 15 of 230 units
89. Pakalski v. CFC Pasadena Golf, L.L.C., 42 So. 3d 869, 869 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2010).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 870.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Pakalski, 42 So. 3d at 870.
95. See id. at 870. The trial court, in dismissing the second amended complaint with
prejudice, pointed out that based on the contract there was no point in trying to amend the
complaint. See id.
96. 519 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
97. Pakalski, 42 So. 3d at 870-71.
98. Id. at 870.
99. 46 So. 3d 144 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
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contemplated by their agreement.'" Sub-subcontractor collected in full from
Subcontractor's surety-in an action brought under chapter 713 of the Flori-
da Statutes-for Sub-subcontractor's work on the fifteen completed units.'o
In this regard, Subcontractor did not dispute that the work subject to the
chapter 713 action was completed by Sub-subcontractor. 0 2 Subcontractor
did, however, in Sub-subcontractor's suit against Subcontractor seeking to
recover lost profits on the remaining units, dispute "the existence of a bind-
ing contract" and, in addition, contended that Sub-subcontractor was barred
from collecting lost profits from Subcontractor under "[t]he election of re-
medies doctrine."1 03 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Subcontractor on the election of remedies theory and it was this order that
was before the Fifth District Court of Appeal.'" What the trial court ruled,
was that Sub-subcontractor, by collecting "the reasonable value" of its ser-
vices and materials from the surety, had elected its remedy and could not
attempt to collect from Subcontractor.05 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
reversed.106 Pursuing one remedy does not necessarily prevent the pursuance
of others."0" There were two scenarios under which the election of remedies
doctrine could have been invoked, but neither applied here.0 s If a plaintiff
receives complete satisfaction in an earlier action, then the plaintiff cannot
get a double recovery in a later action.' 09 Here, Sub-subcontractor could not
have recovered, under chapter 713, for lost profits from the surety, so that
scenario was inapplicable."0 The other scenario would have required Sub-
subcontractor to have sued Subcontractor for the reasonable value of the ser-
vices or materials provided by Sub-subcontractor; that is, sued in quantum
meruit."' Had that been the case, the action against Subcontractor would
have been barred since Sub-subcontractor would have, under the election of
remedies doctrine, waived its right to lost profits and Sub-subcontractor
could not again have recovered what it had already recovered from the sure-
ty.112
100. See id. at 145.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Barbe v. Villeneuve, 505 So. 2d 1331, 1332 (Fla. 1987)).
104. Plumbing Serv. Co., 46 So. 3d at 145.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 146.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. Plumbing Serv. Co., 46 So. 3d at 146.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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B. Subcontractor as Third-Party Beneficiary of a Contract
Mustapick Companies, Incorporated (General Contractor) and Mr. and
Mrs. Esposito (Property Owners) were parties to a contract (Primary Con-
tract) for the construction of a home.113 General Contractor in turn engaged
True Color Enterprises Construction, Incorporated (Subcontractor) to do the
painting work on the house.' 14 Property Owners sued Subcontractor alleging
that Subcontractor's negligence enabled an arsonist to enter the premises
"during the night and set fires" to the home causing damage to the premis-
es.115 The trial court dismissed the action, agreeing with Subcontractor's
argument that it was the "third-party beneficiary" of the particular provision
contained in the Primary Contract under which Subcontractor "claimed pro-
tection" from the allegations against it.' 6 Property Owners appealed and
Subcontractor cited Mullray v. Aire-Lok Co."' in support of its position that
it was an intended third-party beneficiary of the Primary Contract."' The
Fourth District Court of Appeal found this case to be of no help to Subcon-
tractor.19 Although Mullray can stand for the proposition that the owners of
property can sustain an action for negligence against subcontractors, that
does not mean that subcontractors become third-party beneficiaries of the
main contract. 20 Subcontractor failed the intended third-party beneficiary
test, which requires a clearly expressed intent to that effect on the part of
both parties to the contract.'2 '
C. Enforcement of a Contract by or Against an Unlicensed Subcontractor
The numerous amendments over the past decade to several statutes
dealing with enforcement of contracts by or against unlicensed contractors
do not appear to have reduced the uncertainty in this area. For example, in
one case involving a subcontractor, the trial court declined to enforce a build-
113. Esposito v. True Color Enters. Constr., Inc., 45 So. 3d 554, 555 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2010).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. The opinion does not specify what the terms of the contract were on which Sub-
contractor relied and sought to have applied to itself as a third-party beneficiary. See id. at
556.
117. 216 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
118. Esposito, 45 So. 3d at 555-56.
119. Id. at 556.
120. Compare id. at 557, with Mullray, 216 So. 2d at 801, 803.
121. Esposito, 45 So. 3d at 555-56.
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ing subcontractor's contract against its contractor.122  The Third District
Court of Appeal reversed.123 The subcontractor did not have "a specialty
contractor's license as required by the Miami-Dade County Code of Ordin-
ances (MDCO)." 24 Failure to have the license subjected the subcontractor to
various monetary and other penalties under the MDCO, but denial of enfor-
ceability of contracts was not among them.125 Although the Third District
Court of Appeal quoted the Supreme Court of Florida as stating that
"'[w]here a statute pronounces a penalty for an act, a contract founded upon
such act is void, although the statute does not pronounce it void or expressly
prohibit it,"' 26 the Third District Court of Appeal, relying mainly on Corbin
on Contracts127 and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,12 8 decided that a
contractual party who is unlicensed-in violation of an ordinance that pro-
vides penalties but is silent as to the violation's effect on the enforceability of
the underlying contract-is not automatically precluded from a remedy for
breach of contract.129 In those cases, the trial court must engage in fact find-
ing-as detailed in this opinion-to determine if the unlicensed plaintiff
should be allowed to proceed.'3o
In another case, T & G Corporation (Contractor) sued an unlicensed
contractor, Earth Trades, Incorporated (Subcontractor), for breach of con-
tract.131 The trial judge ruled in favor of Contractor.132 Subcontractor ap-
pealed, claiming that the trial judge should have allowed it to raise, as an
affirmative defense to enforcement of the contract by Contractor, knowledge
on the part of Contractor of Subcontractor's "lack of a license." 3 3 The Fifth
District Court of Appeal noted that Contractor's knowledge of the lack of a
license was in dispute, but under the pertinent statute, section 489.128 of the
Florida Statutes, as amended effective June 25, 2003, "a contract with an
unlicensed contractor was unenforceable only by the unlicensed contrac-
tor." 13
122. MGM Constr. Servs. Corp. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 57 So. 3d 884, 885
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 886.
126. Id. at 887 (quoting Town of Boca Raton v. Raulerson, 146 So. 576, 577 (Fla. 1933)).
127. 15 GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 88.3 (rev. ed. 2003).
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 181 (1981).
129. MGM Constr. Servs. Corp., 57 So. 3d at 889.
130. See id. at 890.
131. Earth Trades, Inc. v. T & G Corp., 42 So. 3d 929, 930 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 489.128 (2011).
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However, the Third District Court of Appeal, in a case where the con-
tractor and the subcontractor each defended against claims by the other on
the ground "that the other was an unlicensed contractor under section
489.128," concluded that summary judgment was improper because of "ge-
nuine issues of material fact," and included among the list of disputed facts
was "the parties' knowledge of each other's lack of licensure."l35
In yet another case, the contractor-vendor (MMII) contracted with the
Silvesters (Buyers) for the purchase and installation of an audio entertain-
ment system in Buyers' home. 136 After the installation was completed, Buy-
ers refused to pay claiming that "MMII was an unlicensed contractor" and
the contract was thus unenforceable.137 The trial court agreed with Buyers.'
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed. 139 "[T]here is no licensure
requirement for selling and installing entertainment systems." 40 The trial
court misinterpreted sections 489.105(3) and 489.505(12) of the Florida Sta-
tutes.141 MMII was neither a contractor nor an electrical contractor in the
statutory sense.14 2 The limited electrical work performed by MMII was inci-
dental to its entertainment system sales and installation.14 3
However, in another case involving electrical work, the Third District
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's determination that the subcontrac-
tor, an installer of a digital satellite system, did need a license and thus could
not enforce its contract against the contractor.'" It should be noted that this
was an appeal of a summary judgment and in affirming the trial court's deci-
sion, the district court agreed that the subcontractor had failed to demonstrate
there were disputed issues of material fact.145 Judge Salter dissented, relying
135. Austin Bldg. Co. v. Rago, Ltd., 63 So. 3d 31, 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
136. MMII, Inc. v. Silvester, 42 So. 3d 876, 877 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per cu-
riam). This case differed from the other cases reported in this Survey in that the dispute was
not between the contractor and the subcontractor, but rather, was between the buyer and the
contractor. Compare id., with Austin Bldg. Co., 63 So. 3d at 33. It is submitted that whether
or not this is a distinction without a difference is not entirely clear. See Master Tech Satellite,
Inc. v. Mastec N. Am., Inc., 49 So. 3d 789, 795 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (Salter, J., dis-
senting) (per curiam).
137. MMII, Inc., 42 So. 3d at 877.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 878.
140. Id. at 877.
141. Id.; FLA. STAT. §§ 489.105(3), 505(12) (2011).
142. MMII, Inc., 42 So. 3d at 877.
143. Id.
144. Master Tech Satellite, Inc. v. Mastec N. Am., Inc., 49 So. 3d 789, 790-91 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam).
145. Id. at 791.
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in part on the Fourth District Court of Appeal decision 4 6 in MMII, Inc. v.
Silvester.'47
D. Implied Warranties of Habitability, Fitness, and Merchantability as
Applied to Real Estate Improvements to Common Areas
In Lakeview Reserve Homeowners v. Maronda Homes, Inc.,'148 Lake-
view Reserve Homeowners Association, Incorporated (Association) sued
Maronda Homes, Incorporated (Developer) alleging certain defects in De-
veloper's construction of a water drainage system, private roadways, reten-
tion ponds, and pipes located underground.149 The theory supporting Associ-
ation's suit was "breach of the common law implied warranties of fitness and
merchantability, also referred to as a warranty of habitability."5 o The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of Developer, relying on Conklin
v. Hurley'5 ' and Port Sewall Harbor & Tennis Club Owners Ass'n v. First
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Martin County,'52 and Association ap-
pealed.'53 Amicus curiae briefs were filed on behalf of Developer by Florida
Home Builders Association and on behalf of Association by Community
Associations Institute. 154 Developer contended that the water drainage sys-
tem, private roadways, retention ponds, and pipes located underground did
"not immediately support the residences" and that the common law implied
warranties of fitness and merchantability did not apply to structures "not
immediately support[ing] the residences."' 5 After reviewing the evolving
application of the rule of caveat emptor to home construction, and consider-
ing the facts and holdings of Conklin and Port Sewall Harbor & Tennis Club
Owners Ass'n, the Fifth District Court of Appeal announced its test for de-
termining if the common law implied warranty of habitability would apply
under the facts presented in this case as to whether "in the absence of the
146. Id. at 795 (Salter, J., dissenting).
147. 42 So. 3d 876 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam).
148. 48 So. 3d 902 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review granted, 58 So. 3d 261 (Fla.
2011).
149. Id. at 904.
150. Id. at 903-04.
151. 428 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1983).
152. 463 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
153. Lakeview, 48 So. 3d at 903-04.
154. Brief for Florida Home Builders Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, Lake-
view Reserve Homeowners v. Maronda Homes, Inc., 48 So. 3d 902 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2010), review granted, 58 So. 3d 261 (Fla. 2011); Brief for Community Ass'ns Institute as
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Lakeview Reserve Homeowners v. Maronda Homes,
Inc., 48 So. 3d 902 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review granted, 58 So. 3d 261 (Fla. 2011).
155. Lakeview, 48 So. 3d at 904.
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service, is the home inhabitable, that is, is it an improvement providing a
service essential to the habitability of the home? If it is, then the implied
warranties apply."l5 6 The court went on to hold that the "warranties of fit-
ness for a particular purpose, habitability, and merchantability apply to struc-
tures in [the] common areas . . . [if they] immediately support the residence
in the form of essential services."' Thus, the Fifth District Court of Appeal
interpreted the Supreme Court of Florida's classification of improvements
"immediately supporting the residence" as stated in Conklin, as including
those "services essential to . .. habitability" such as a water drainage system,
private roadways, retention ponds, and pipes located underground.' 8 The
Fifth District Court of Appeal certified conflict with the Fourth District Court
of Appeal in Port Sewall Harbor & Tennis Club Owners Ass'n.'" The Su-
preme Court of Florida accepted jurisdiction and several briefs on the merits
have been filed by the parties and amicus curiae.'
VII. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Non-Compete Agreement Enforced with Respect to Unsolicited
Customer
In Hilb Rogal & Hobbs of Florida, Inc. v. Grimmel,161 the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal reinstated a temporary injunction that had been dis-
solved by the trial court.162 The case makes it clear that a former employee
may be prohibited by the terms of a valid non-compete agreement from "ac-
cepting an invitation from" an unsolicited customer of the former employer
to do work for the customer.16 3 The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
the general magistrate's "finding of no legitimate business interest [under
section 542.335 of the Florida Statutes was] clearly erroneous."'6" This find-
ing was adopted by the trial court initially, and reaffirmed in its decision
after a hearing held after remand from an appeal to the Fourth District Court
of Appeal.16 5 In addition, the public interest requirement for granting of a
156. Id. at 907-09.
157. Id. at 909.
158. Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d. 654, 655 (Fla. 1983); Lakeview, 48 So. 3d at 909.
159. Lakeview, 48 So. 3d at 909.
160. See Maronda Homes, Inc. v. Lakeview Reserve Homeowners Ass'n, Nos. SC1O-
2292, SCIO-2336, 2011 WL 1537263, at *1 (Fla. Apr. 20, 2011) (unpublished table decision).
161. 48 So. 3d 957 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
162. Id. at 962.
163. Id. at 961.
164. Id. at 959, 961; FLA. STAT. § 542.335 (2011).
165. Grimmel, 48 So. 3d at 959, 962.
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temporary injunction was satisfied because "'the public has a cognizable
interest in the protection and enforcement of contractual rights."" 66 Thus,
the former employee would have to have shown that public policy considera-
tions against enforcement substantially outweighed the interests established
by the former employer who sought to enforce the covenant.'67 The district
court held that "[t]he fact that the customers will have to use a different in-
surance broker does not make the enforcement of this agreement against pub-
lic policy."'
B. Temporary Injunction Denied: Grandparent Corporation Could Not
Enforce Pre-Existing Non-Compete Agreement Between Newly Ac-
quired (Sub-subsidiary) Corporation and Newly Acquired Corpora-
tion's Former Employee
Mr. Kimbler (Former Alltel Employee) was employed by AlItel Corpo-
ration (Alltel) and in 2002, signed a "nondisclosure and nonsolicitation
agreement" (Non-Compete Agreement) with "Alltel or any of its affiliated
companies."" While Alltel and Cellco Partnership (Cellco) "were competi-
tors, not affiliated companies," when the Non-Compete Agreement was
signed in 2002, in 2008, Alitel and Cellco entered into what was described as
a "merger transaction" pursuant to a "plan of merger (reverse merger
plan)."o As a result of the "merger" in 2009, Former Alltel Employee brief-
ly became a Verizon employee, but within six months, went to work for
Sprint/Nextel (New Employer).' 7' Within a short time thereafter, Cellco
instituted its action against Former Alltel Employee, alleging that Former
Alltel Employee provided New Employer with valuable Alltel customer in-
formation, and Cellco sought an injunction against Former Alltel Employee
based on the agreement with Alltel." The trial court denied the request, and
166. Id. at 962 (quoting Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Acevedo, No. 08-21808-CIV, 2008 WL
2940667, at *6 (S.D. Fla. July 28, 2008)). The Fourth District Court of Appeal stated that to
uphold a temporary injunction, the former employer would have to prove .'(1) the likelihood
of irreparable harm, (2) the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law, (3) a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits, and (4) that a temporary injunction will serve the public
interest."' Id. at 959 (quoting Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Carter, 9 So. 3d 1258, 1261 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2009)).
167. See id. at 962 (citing Pitney Bowes, Inc., 2008 WL 2940667, at *6).
168. Id.
169. Cellco P'ship v. Kimbler, 68 So. 3d 914, 916 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
170. Id. at 915-16.
17 1. Id.
172. Id. at 916.
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the second district court affirmed.173 The Non-Compete Agreement was not
assigned by Alltel to Cellco and did not contain an assignment clause.174
Alltel still held the rights under the agreement with Former Alltel Em-
ployee.175 The second district upheld the trial court's findings that Alltel no
longer had a Florida retail cell phone business or Florida customer accounts,
and concluded that "Alltel assigned its Florida customer contracts to Cell-
co."l76 Alltel's going out of the retail cell phone business in Florida was a
defense to the alleged breach of the restrictive covenant, there no longer be-
ing a legitimate business interest to protect. 1 Cellco could not enforce the
Non-Compete Agreement because Cellco could not have been an affiliate of
Alltel when the agreement was signed because they were in fact then com-
petitors. 7 1
The Second District Court of Appeal acknowledged that section
542.335(1)(f) of the Florida Statutes does permit a nonparty to enforce a
covenant in certain circumstances.'79 A third party may enforce a restrictive
covenant when the "third-party beneficiary of the contract or an assignee or
successor ... is expressly named and authorized to enforce the [contract]."'18
The district court continued, "[a]nd here, the undisputed evidence was that
Alltel and Cellco did not merge and that Alltel did not assign the restrictive
covenant rights to Cellco. . . . Further, Cellco and Alltel are separate legal
entities, and as such, Cellco-the parent corporation-cannot 'exercise the
rights of its subsidiary. 8'
Although the mechanics and details of the transaction were not set forth
in the opinion, the Second District Court of Appeal said that at the time the
"merger" became effective in 2009, "Alltel assigned its Florida customer
contracts to Cellco."l 82 However, at the conclusion of its opinion, the Second
District Court of Appeal held that Cellco was not an "assignee, or successor
in interest to the Alltel [former employee]" and, as noted, that "Alltel and
Cellco did not merge." 83 In order to fully appreciate the court's holding, it is
important to emphasize what the district court noted in a footnote: "Cellco
173. Id. at 916, 918.
174. Cellco P'ship, 68 So. 3d at 916.
175. Id. at 917.
176. Id. at 916.
177. Id. at 917.
178. Id.
179. Cellco P'ship, 68 So. 3d at 917; FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(f) (2011).
180. Celico P'ship, 68 So. 3d at 917 (citing FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(f)).
181. Id. at 917-18 (quoting Am. Int'l Grp., Inc. v. Cornerstone Buss., 872 So. 2d 333, 336
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
182. Id. at 916.
183. Id. at 917-18.
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owns AirTouch Cellular, a nonparty to this action. In turn, AirTouch is the
100% owner of Alltel. But Cellco and Alltel remain separate legal enti-
ties."'8 4 With that in mind, the reason the district court affirmed the trial
court's denial of the injunction becomes clearer.
C. Employer Held Immune from Negligence Action by Borrowed Employee
In Fossett v. Southeast Toyota Distributors, LLC,'18 Ivy Fossett (Em-
ployee) was employed by Adecco, a help supply services company.18 6 Adec-
co contracted with Southeast Toyota Distributors, LLC (SET) for Em-
ployee's services.'87  Employee was seriously injured while on the job at
SET.'18  Although Employee settled her workers' compensation claim
against Adecco, she also sued SET, alleging negligence.'89 The trial court
granted SET's motion for summary judgment, and Employee appealed.'
SET, relying on section 440.11 of the Florida Statutes, claimed immunity
"from liability for simple negligence [with respect] to any Adecco employee
injured doing SET's work," that is, immunity by virtue of the workers' com-
pensation statute.' 9' In order to be shielded from liability, SET had to show
that Employee was subject to its general supervision.192 Employee claimed
that no one at SET supervised her, that is, that "she never received instruc-
tion from SET on how to do her job."'93 She also testified that she worked at
SET under the supervision of another Adecco employee.194 However, SET
184. Id. at 916 n.1.
185. 60 So. 3d 1155 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
186. Id. at 1156.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Fossett, 60 So. 3d at 1156.
191. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.11(2) (2011)).
192. Id. at 157-58 (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.11(2)).
193. Id. at 1158.
194. Id. The First District Court of Appeal referred to the help supplied as being paid by
the company supplying the help "but is under the direct or general supervision of the business
to whom the help is furnished." Fossett, 60 So. 3d at 1157 (quoting St. Lucie Falls Prop.
Owners Ass'n v. Morelli, 956 So. 2d 1283, 1285 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007)). The district
court noted that "[t]he 'general supervision' section 440.11(2) contemplates, in incorporating
OSHA Standard Industry Code Industry Number 7363, is the legal power to direct." Id. at
1158. Thus, the First District Court of Appeal made it clear that the determination in the case
before it did not turn on who was in direct supervision "of the work of the help supply servic-
es company employee," as argued by Employee, but rather who had the "power to control"
and supervise the work of the Employee. Id. As stated by the district court, "[tihe present
case turns on 'general supervision,' not 'direct supervision."' Id.
2011] 55
21
Landau: 2010-2011 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
had the right to supervise and to control-and that controlled.195 The extent
of the exercise of that right was "immaterial" and the district court af-
firmed.'16
VIII. FIDUCIARY DUTY AND GOVERNANCE
The litigation that gave rise to the matter before the Supreme Court of
Florida in Wendt v. La Costa Beach Resort Condominium Ass'n, Inc. (Wendt
II),'7 was La Costa Beach Resort Condominium Association, Incorporated's
(Association's) lawsuit that alleged breach of fiduciary duty on the part of
certain directors of Association. 98 After a verdict was rendered in Associa-
tion's breach of fiduciary case, "the directors moved for a new trial," and
they also filed a separate action against Association seeking indemnifica-
tion-under section 607.0850 of the Florida Statutes-for expenses the di-
rectors had incurred in defending against Association's breach of fiduciary
claims.'" The trial court dismissed the indemnification complaint with pre-
judice, the directors appealed, and the trial court's dismissal was upheld by
the Fourth District Court of Appeal.2 00 However, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal had noted conflict 20 1 between its decision in Wendt v. La Costa Beach
Resort Condominium Ass'n, Inc. (Wendt 1)202 and the decision of the First
District Court of Appeal in Turkey Creek Master Owners Ass'n. v. Hope.203
Section 607.0850 of the Florida Statutes directs corporations, under certain
circumstances, to indemnify its officers' and directors' expenses incurred in
legal proceedings arising from their positions. 204 The issue was whether sec-
tion 607.0850 covers the situation where the corporation sues its own direc-
tors.205 The Supreme Court of Florida agreed with the First District Court of
Appeal which had answered the question in the affirmative, and the Supreme
Court of Florida thus quashed the opinion of the fourth district. 206 The plain
language of the statute does not forbid indemnification in such cases.207
195. Id.
196. Fossett, 60 So. 3d at 1158.
197. 64 So. 3d 1288 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam).
198. Id. at 1229.
199. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 607.0850 (2011)).
200. Id.
201. See id.
202. 14 So. 3d 1179 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009), quashed by 64 So. 3d 1228 (Fla. 2011).
203. 766 So. 2d 1245, 1247 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam).
204. FLA. STAT. § 607.0850.
205. Wendt 11, 64 So. 3d 1228, 1229 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam).
206. Id. at 1231.
207. Id.
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However, the court "expressly [did] not reach the merits of whether indemni-
fication is applicable under the facts of [the] case."208 Justice Quince dis-
sented.20
On June 9, 2011, the same day as the Supreme Court of Florida issued
its opinion in Wendt 11,210 the court rendered its decision in Banco Industrial
de Venezuela C.A. v. de Saad.2 1' The decision of the Third District Court of
Appeal, discussed in the 2009-2010 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Busi-
ness Owners, in some detail, was quashed.212 There were two main issues
involved; one, the indemnification issue, and the other, a breach of contract
issue.213 With respect to the indemnification claim by de Saad (Offic-
er/Employee)-as she was referred to in the 2009-2010 Survey of Florida
Law Affecting Business Owners-the Supreme Court of Florida set forth
several reasons why the indemnification by Banco Industrial De Venezuela
C.A., Miami Agency (Bank) was not available to Officer/Employee.2 14 First,
the court held that section 607.0850 of the Florida Statutes did not apply to
the corporate entity against which Officer/Employee made the claim since
Bank was a foreign corporation-a Venezuelan bank that had been autho-
rized to do business in the state of Florida.215 The court pointed out that even
though foreign corporations authorized to do business in Florida have sub-
stantially the same rights and obligations as domestic corporations, there are
exceptions, and one exception is that under section 607.1505(3) of the Flori-
da Statutes, Florida may not regulate the "internal affairs of a foreign corpo-
ration" even though the corporation has been authorized to do business in
Florida.2 16 The Supreme Court of Florida held that "[c]orporate indemnifica-
tion is one such matter of internal affairs." 2 17 Officer/Employee argued that
208. Id.
209. Id. (Quince, J., dissenting).
210. Wendt 11, 64 So. 3d at 1228.
211. 68 So. 3d 895, 901 (Fla. 2011).
212. Id. at 901; see Barbara Landau, 2009-2010 Survey of Florida Iaw Affecting Business
Owners, 35 NOVA L. REV. 1, 9-11 (2010) [hereinafter Landau, 2009-2010 Survey of Florida
Law Affecting Business Owners].
213. Banco, 68 So. 3d at 897. The summary judgment awarding Officer/Employee
$1,058,023.82 was quashed, and the Supreme Court of Florida held that Bank "did not breach
the employment contract by keeping [Officer/Employer] on unpaid suspension." Id. at 901.
The court quashed the third district's decision, and remanded "for entry of final judgment in
favor of [Bank]." Id.
214. Id. at 898-900; see Landau, 2009-2010 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business
Owners, supra note 212, at 9-11.
215. Banco, 68 So. 3d at 898-99.
216. Id. at 898 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 607.1505(3) (2011)).
217. Id. (citing Chatlos Found., Inc. v. D'Arata, 882 So. 2d 1021, 1023 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2004)).
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Bank made section 607.0850 applicable to itself when it entered into an em-
ployment agreement with Officer/Employee that contained a Florida choice
of law provision.218 The Supreme Court of Florida dealt with that argument
by pointing out that in making Florida law the applicable law, Bank, as a
foreign corporation was under the express language of the Florida statute and
"not subject to regulation" by Florida with respect to its internal affairs.2 19
The court did not end its analysis of the indemnification issue there, howev-
er.22 0 Rather, the court held that even if the foreign corporation was subject
to the indemnification statute, Officer/Employee did not satisfy the statutory
requirements for indemnification. 22' The court emphasized the "by reason of
the fact" language of section 607.0850(1); that is, that the person must have
been a party "by reason of the fact" of his status as an officer or employee.22 2
The court noted that Officer/Employee "was not prosecuted 'by reason of the
fact' that she was a corporate officer . . . . [S]he was prosecuted for her con-
duct, not on account of her position. This conduct was not required by her
position as a corporate officer and was, in fact, contrary to corporate poli-
cy." 22
3
IX. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
A. Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet
Two Worlds United (Plaintiff) had its principal place of business in
Tampa.224 Plaintiff sued a California resident, Mr. Zylstra (Defendant), and
others, claiming that Defendant "posted defamatory statements [about Plain-
tiff] on a website owned and operated by [Defendant]."225 Defendant con-
tested the Florida court's personal jurisdiction over him by filing an affidavit
stating that his solely owned corporation owned the website and that he did
not personally post anything on the website regarding Plaintiff.2 26 Plaintiff
did not rebut Defendant's affidavit, and Defendant was thus protected by the
corporate shield doctrine.227 Plaintiff relied on Internet Solutions Corp. v.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 898-99.
220. Banco, 68 So. 3d at 899.
221. Id.
222. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 607.0850(1) (2011).
223. Banco, 68 So. 3d at 900 (citations omitted).
224. Two Worlds United v. Zylstra, 46 So. 3d 1175, 1176 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1177-78.
227. Id. at 1178 (citing Doe v. Thompson, 620 So. 2d 1004, 1006 (Fla. 1993)).
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Marshall,2 8 but the Second District Court of Appeal found Plaintiffs re-
liance on Internet Solutions Corp. misplaced because there, "the nonresident
owner and operator of the website personally posted defamatory statements
regarding the plaintiff" in that case.229 In addition, the district court pointed
out that the corporate shield doctrine was not addressed in the Internet Solu-
tions Corp. decision.230 Plaintiff also lost on the issue regarding section
48.193(2) "'substantial and not isolated activity"' in Florida because Defen-
dant "testified that he ha[d] not lived in Florida since 1994" and visited "only
a few times a year to [see] family and friends." 2 3' These, under Radcliffe v.
Gyves,232 the court said, were insufficient contacts to satisfy personal juris-
diction requirements under section 48.193(2).233 Finally, Defendant's at-
tempt to recover his attorney fees under section 57.105 of the Florida Sta-
tutes did not amount to a waiver of the defense of lack of personal jurisdic-
tion.234 The motion for fees "was defensive and did not seek affirmative re-
lief."235
In a case involving a complaint for violation of the Florida Securities
and Investor Protection Act,236 Mr. Elias (Plaintiff) alleged that Enzyme En-
vironmental Solutions, Inc. (Defendant Corporation) was "a Nevada corpora-
tion, located in . . . Indiana, [but] conducting business in . . .Florida." 2 37 The
individual defendants were officers of the Defendant Corporation.238 One of
the individual defendants stated "that he live[d] in Indiana and ha[d] never
resided, worked, or operated a business in Florida." 239 He also stated that
"[h]e [did] not have a telephone, post office box, or office in Florida."2 40 The
other individual defendant's declaration was similar, but, "he lived in Florida
from 1988 until 1990.",241 Plaintiff alleged that he was the victim of a securi-
ties "pump and dump" fraud perpetrated via the Internet. 242 The individual
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
197-98
235.
236.
237.
2011).
238.
239.
39 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 2010).
Two Worlds United, 46 So. 3d at 1178.
Id.
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (2) (2011)).
902 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
Two Worlds United, 46 So. 3d at 1178 (citing Radcliffe, 902 So. 2d at 972 n.4).
Id. at 1177; FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (2005); see Heineken v. Heineken, 683 So. 2d 194,
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Two Worlds United, 46 So. 3d at 1177.
FLA. STAT. § 517.011 (2011).
Enzyme Envtl. Solutions, Inc. v. Elias, 60 So. 3d 1158, 1159 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
Id. at 1159-60.
Id. at 160.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Elias, 60 So. 3d at 1160.
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defendants argued that they did not have sufficient minimum contacts with
Florida "to comport with due process," and the appellate court agreed with
them.243
In the instant case, there is no evidence that the false state-
ments were purposefully directed toward the residents of Florida.
Assuming the defendants were actually trying to "pump and
dump" their stock, they were targeting anyone and everyone who
might go on the Internet to read about stocks on websites that pub-
lish information about stocks. 24
The two cases just discussed involved jurisdiction and the Internet.245
The next case also involved the Internet, and even though the appellant had
"filed a notice of voluntary dismissal," the Fourth District Court of Appeal
stated it decided not to dismiss "[b]ecause we believe that this case involves
an issue of great public importance." 246 Instead of dismissing, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal, in Caiazzo v. American Royal Arts Corp.,247 re-
viewed the subject of personal jurisdiction under Florida law and then dis-
cussed the application of the law to the Internet.248 The court cited Zippo
Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,249 as a leading case dealing with
how an internet site affects personal jurisdiction.250 Zippo Manufacturing
Co.'s analysis placed the site owner on a spectrum of commercial interactivi-
ty ranging from passive to active and/or clearly doing business. 25' However,
the Fourth District Court of Appeal, while acknowledging that "a clear ma-
jority of federal courts ha[ve] adopted the Zippo [Manufacturing Co.] analyt-
ical framework," rejected it as controlling in Florida.252 The district court
concluded that doing business over the Internet did not fundamentally
change Florida's analysis under section 48.193(1)-as to specific jurisdic-
tion-and section 48.193(2)-as to general jurisdiction-in determining the
existence of minimum contacts for due process purposes as applied to specif-
ic jurisdiction determinations or in determining the existence of minimum
243. Id. at 1161.
244. Id. at 1162.
245. See Two Worlds United v. Zylstra, 46 So. 3d 1175, 1176 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2010); Elias, 60 So. 3d at 1160.
246. Caiazzo v. Am. Royal Arts Corp., 36 Ha. L. Weekly D 1l74, D1174 (4th Dist. Ct.
App. June 1, 2011) (per curiam).
247. 36 Fla. L. Weekly D 1174 (4th Dist. Ct. App. June 1, 2011) (per curiam).
248. See id. at DI 174-77.
249. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
250. Caiazzo, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at DI 176 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124).
251. Id. (citing Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124).
252. Id.
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contacts in the general jurisdiction context.253 The district court stated that
with respect to minimum contacts, "we choose to continue to apply a tradi-
tional minimum contacts analysis in personal jurisdiction questions, whether
or not the [I]nternet is involved." 254
B. Venue-Joint Residency Rule Did Not Apply
In Pill ex rel. Estate of Bassali v. Merco Group of the Palm Beaches,
Inc.,255 there were corporate and individual defendants located in Miami-
Dade County.256 The defendants were sued in Palm Beach County where the
cause of action accrued. 257 The defendants successfully moved the trial court
to transfer venue to Miami-Dade County citing the joint residency venue
rule.258 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that venue
was properly laid in Palm Beach County.259 Section 47.011 of the Florida
Statutes allows the plaintiff to choose as venue "'the county where the de-
fendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property
[subject to] litigation is located."' 260 The joint residency rule requires venue
"in the county where . . . individual . . . and corporate defendant[s] share a
residence, [provided that it] is also the [county] where the cause of action
accrued."26' In other words, "the joint residency rule applies only when ve-
nue is based upon residency."262 In this case, the cause of action accrued in
Palm Beach County, which the plaintiff was permitted to choose as the venue
under section 47.011, notwithstanding the joint residency of the defen-
dants.263
253. See id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (2011); Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39
So. 3d 1201, 1216 n.11 (Fla. 2010); Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 502
(Fla. 1989); Renaissance Health Publ'g, L.L.C. v. Resveratrol Partners, L.L.C., 982 So. 2d
739, 742 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
254. Id. at DI177.
255. 56 So. 3d 890 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
256. Id. at 891.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 892.
260. Pill ex rel. Estate of Bassali, 56 So. 3d at 891 (emphasis omitted) (quoting FLA. STAT.
§ 47.011 (2011)).
261. Id. at 892 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Brown v. Nagelhout, 33 So. 3d 83, 84 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 48 So. 3d 835 (Fla. 2010)).
262. Id. at 891.
263. Id. at 891-92; FLA. STAT. § 47.011.
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X. MORTGAGES
A. Constructive Notice Was Given Despite Property Description Error in
Mortgage
Fidelity Bank of Florida (Bank) took back a first mortgage on certain
real estate. 264 This mortgage document, the "first-recorded mortgage," was
correct as to the identity of the owner of the property, and the lot and subdi-
vision were correctly stated.265 While the plat book was also correctly de-
scribed, the mortgage incorrectly stated the plat book page as page three; the
correct page, however, was page eight. 26 6 Bank filed a foreclosure action and
joined another mortgagee (Other Mortgagee) as a defendant.267 On motion
for summary judgment, the trial court agreed with Other Mortgagee that
Bank's error put Other Mortgagee in a superior position. 268 The Fifth District
Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment in fa-
vor of Other Mortgagee, holding that notwithstanding Bank's error, Other
Mortgagee had constructive notice of Bank's earlier recorded mortgage.269
The district court "direct[ed] the trial court to enter summary judgment" in
favor of Bank which judgment was to declare the superior position of
Bank.270
B. Florida's Recording Statute is Still a Notice Statute
Mr. and Mrs. Burkes (Borrowers) owed money to Argent Mortgage
Company, LLC (Argent) and Wachovia Bank, N.A. (Wachovia) on notes
and mortgages they had given to each lender. 271 The Wachovia mortgage
was signed on August 31, 2004, but was not recorded until January 5,
2005 .272 The Argent mortgage was signed on December 10, 2004, and the
date of recording was January 31, 2005.273 Borrowers defaulted on the mort-
264. Fid. Bank of Fla. v. Nguyen, 44 So. 3d 1238, 1239 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010),
review denied, 57 So. 3d 846 (Fla. 2011).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Fid. Bank of Fla., 44 So. 3d at 1239 (citing Sickler v. Melbourne State Bank, 159 So.
678, 679 (Fla. 1935); Merrell v. Ridgely, 57 So. 352, 353 (Fla. 1912)).
270. Id.
271. Argent Mortg. Co. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 52 So. 3d 796, 798 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2010).
272. Id.
273. Id.
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gages and in consolidated foreclosure actionS274 the issue became which
lender had priority. 275 The trial court ruled for Wachovia, but the Fifth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal reversed.276 The trial court accepted Wachovia's argu-
ment that Florida's recording statute, section 695.01 of the Florida Statutes,
had to be read together with section 695.11 of the Florida Statutes, which
deals with the sequence of recording, and "determining the time at which an
instrument [is] deemed to be recorded," which the argument went, made
Florida's statute a statute of the race-notice variety rather than a notice sta-
tute.277 The Fifth District Court of Appeal summarized the differences be-
tween a notice statute, a race statute, and a race-notice statute. 278 The district
court noted that commentators and a long line of cases in Florida have con-
cluded that section 695.01 is a notice statute, so that a lender taking for value
and without notice takes priority over an earlier lender for value who fails to
record loan documents prior to the loan by the second lender, even if the
second lender's recording took place after the first lender's recording, that is,
regardless of the order of recording.279 In order for Wachovia to have pre-
vailed, it would have been necessary to prove that Argent had actual notice
of Wachovia's loan at the time it loaned money to Borrowers, and "the trial
court [had] made findings on facts not in dispute, including ... Argent's lack
of actual or constructive notice" of the Wachovia mortgage when the Argent
mortgage was executed.280
C. Municipal Ordinance Creating Lien Priority Violates Priority of Re-
cording Statute
The next case, City of Palm Bay v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 28 1 involves
section 695.11 of the Florida Statutes. 282 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
held that a local ordinance that gave the city's code enforcement liens priori-
ty over all other nongovernmental liens, regardless of the order of recording
in accordance with the provisions of section 695.11, was in violation of that
statute, and thus, the statute controlled.2 83 The district court referred to "the
common law principle of first in time, first in right" noting that "instruments
274. Id. at 798 n.1.
275. Id. at 798.
276. Argent Mortg. Co., 52 So. 3d at 797, 801.
277. Id. at 798, 800; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 695.01, 695.11 (2011).
278. Argent Mortg. Co., 52 So. 3d at 798-99.
279. Id. at 799-801 (citations omitted); FLA. STAT. § 695.01.
280. Argent Mortg. Co., 52 So. 3d at 798.
281. 57 So. 3d 226 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 61 So. 3d 410 (Fla. 2011).
282. Id. at 227; FLA. STAT. § 695.11.
283. City of Palm Bay, 57 So. 3d at 227; FLA. STAT. § 695.11.
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such as mortgages and liens will generally follow the first in time rule."284
The district court concluded that "[t]he only way ordinance 97-07 can be
effective is by violating [the Florida statute]."285 Thus, the Fifth District
Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the holder of a prior recorded mortgage.286
It should be noted that unlike the situation in Argent Mortgage Co. v. Wa-
chovia Bank, N.A.,287 this was not a "notice" case.288 This was a case of a
city enacting an ordinance that created priority for certain liens. 2 89 The Fifth
District Court of Appeal granted the City of Palm Bay's motion to certify the
following question to the Supreme Court of Florida:
Whether, under Article VIII, section 2(b), Florida Constitution,
section 166.021, Florida Statutes and Chapter 162, Florida Sta-
tutes, a municipality has the authority to enact an ordinance stating
that its code enforcement liens, created pursuant to a code en-
forcement board order and recorded in the public records of the
applicable county, shall be superior in dignity to prior recorded
mortgages? 290
D. Mortgage Documents Could Not Override Requirements of Civil Pro-
cedure Rule for Ex Parte Appointment of Receiver
In DeSilva v. First Community Bank of America,291 First Community
Bank of America (Lender) began proceedings to foreclose the mortgage it
owned on Mr. DeSilva's (Borrower's) property.29 2 As part of the proceed-
ings, the trial court, ex parte, upon request of Lender for expedited appoint-
ment, appointed a receiver for the property.293 This was accomplished by
Lender filing "an unverified motion to appoint a receiver on an expedited
basis."294 Lender alleged in the motion that a receiver could "avoid com-
plaints from neighbors, and . . . possible code violations," that a receiver
would facilitate the eventual sale of the property to "unidentified potential
buyers," and that the loan documents called for a receiver if Borrower de-
284. City of Palm Bay, 57 So. 3d at 227.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 228.
287. 52 So. 3d 796 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
288. Compare id. at 799, with City of Palm Bay, 57 So. 3d at 227.
289. City of Palm Bay, 57 So. 3d at 227.
290. City of Palm Bay v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 67 So. 3d 271, 271 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App.) (per curiam), review granted, 61 So. 3d 410 (Fla. 2011).
291. 42 So. 3d 285 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
292. Id. at 287.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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faulted.295 The Second District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded.296
Lender failed to comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610 so as to
allow the trial court to appoint a receiver without notice or hearing on its
motion.297 That rule requires, among other things, that the movant show in
an affidavit or a verified pleading by "'specific facts . . . that immediate and
irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the ad-
verse party can be heard in opposition.' 298  That was not done here.2 99
Lender failed to "affirmatively assert[] that the actual value of the property
[is] insufficient to cover the debt," and there was "no evidence that this was
the case." 300 The case also reminds us that even if the mortgage documents
provide for the appointment of a receiver in the event of default, that does
not mean that the requirements of the procedural rule do not apply.30'
E. Statute of Limitations Applicable to Assignor Applies to Assignee of
Mortgage
Ms. Tucker (Guarantor) guaranteed mortgage loans made by the U.S.
Small Business Association to some companies.302 LPP Mortgage Ltd. (As-
signee) was the assignee of the loans. 30 3 When the companies defaulted,
Assignee sued to foreclose, apparently against Guarantor's property. The
trial court ruled that the foreclosure action was barred by the six-year statute
of limitations. 305 Assignee appealed, and the Third District Court of Appeal
reversed.306 An assignee enjoys "the rights and benefits" of the assignor,
including "the benefit of the statute of limitations applicable to the assignor's
295. Id. at 287-88.
296. DeSilva, 42 So. 3d at 287.
297. Id. at 288 (citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610).
298. Id. (quoting FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(a)(1)(A)). The other requirements of the rule in-
clude "the movant's attorney certifies in writing [as to] why notice should not be required"
and the court's inclusion in its order its findings and reasons as to what the irreparable harm
may be, and why the receiver was appointed ex parte. Id. (quoting FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.61 0(a)(1)(B)).
299. Id.
300. DeSilva, 42 So. 3d at 288.
301. Id. (citing Seasons P'ship I v. Kraus-Anderson, Inc., 700 So. 2d 60, 61 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1997)).
302. LPP Mortg. Ltd. v. Tucker, 48 So. 3d 115, 116 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per
curiam), review denied, 60 So. 3d 1055 (Fla. 2011).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 116-17.
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foreclosure action."o30  Under section 2415 of the United States Code308 and
United States v. Thornburg,3" the federal government has an unlimited time
to foreclose on mortgaged property. 31 0 Assignee stepped into the shoes of the
federal government with respect to unlimited time to foreclose.3 1'
XI. TAXES
In Boca Airport, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue,312 Boca Air-
port, Inc., Galaxy Aviation, Inc., and Aviation Center, Inc. (Companies)
were fixed base operators (FBOs).313 They "lease[d] government-owned
airport properties" and "provide[d] goods and services to the general aviation
public." 314 "In 2008, the [Florida] Department of Revenue issued notices of
its intent to [levy] intangible personal property taxes on the leasehold interest
[of each company]." 15 Companies claimed "exempt[ion] from [the] intangi-
ble . . . tax under sections 196.199(2)(a) and 196.012(6) [of the] Florida Sta-
tutes."3 16 The Fourth District Court of Appeal acknowledged that Compa-
nies, as FBOs, were exempt from ad valorem taxation under those sections,
but Companies were not exempt from intangible taxation under section
199.023(1)(d) of the Florida Statutes. 3 17
XII. TORTS
A. Defamation
NITV, LLC and Mr. Baker were competitors in the voice stress analysis
business whereby they distributed the software and provided training to law
enforcement agencies on the use of these programs.18 In 2005, "NITV pre-
pared two documents entitled 'Law Enforcement Alert' and 'Law Enforce-
307. Tucker, 48 So. 3d. at 116 (citations omitted).
308. 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (2006).
309. 82 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 1996).
310. Tucker, 48 So. 3d at 117; Thornburg, 82 F.3d at 894; 28 U.S.C. § 2415(c).
311. Tucker, 48 So.3d at 117.
312. 56 So. 3d 140 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
313. Id. at 140-41.
314. Id. at 141.
315. Id. The years involved were 1998 through 2007 for one company, 1994 through
2007 for another, and 1985 through 2007 for another. Id.
316. Boca Airport, Inc., 56 So. 3d at 142; see FLA. STAT. §§ 196.199(2)(a), 196.012(6)
(2011).
317. Boca Airport, Inc., 56 So. 3d at 144; see FLA. STAT. § 199.023(1)(d) (2005) (repealed
2006).
318. NITV, L.L.C. v. Baker, 61 So. 3d 1249, 1250-51 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
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ment Scam Alert."'3 19 These documents were published to more than 300
law enforcement agencies in Illinois "and as many as 8500 other depart-
ments" in the United States.320 Mr. Baker sued NITV, LLC alleging defama-
tion, and the jury returned a verdict in his favor in the amount of $575,000,
consisting of $225,000 for "loss of ability to earn money in the past,"
$100,000 for "loss of ability to earn money in the future," and $250,000 for
damage to reputation. 321 The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed in
part and reversed in part.322 Mr. Baker did not submit competent substantial
evidence to support the jury's verdict with respect to damages for past and
future loss of ability to earn money, and the appellate court found that Mr.
Baker's testimony was "vague and ill defined."323 In addition, in 2006, his
business income increased substantially. 324 The appellate court vacated the
judgment as to $325,000 in damages. 325 However, the $250,000 award for
damage to reputation was not disturbed. 326 "'Words which are actionable in
themselves, or per se, necessarily import general damages and need not be
pleaded or proved but are conclusively presumed to result."'
32 7
B. Suit by Former Employee Against Supervisor for Tortious Interference
with Business Relationship
After her employment was terminated, a former employee (Employee)
sued her former supervisor (Supervisor) "for tortious interference with an
advantageous business relationship." 3 28 Employee alleged that Supervisor's
"hostile statements and . . . hostile acts" directed against Employee led to her
job termination.329 Supervisor's motion to dismiss on the ground that she and
Employee were co-employees of the business was granted. 3 30 Employee
appealed.3 ' The Third District Court of Appeal noted that it was necessary
for Employee to allege: 1) "a relationship between [Employee] and her em-
319. Id. at 1251.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1250.
322. Id.
323. NITV, L.LC, 61 So. 3d at 1253.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1254.
326. Id.
327. Id. (quoting Bobenhausen v. Cassat Ave. Mobile Homes, Inc., 344 So. 2d 279, 281
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977)).
328. Alexis v. Ventura, 66 So. 3d 986, 987 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
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ployer, under which [she] ha[d] legal rights;" 2) that Supervisor had "know-
ledge of the relationship;" 3) "intentional and unjustified interference with
that relationship;" 4) "[b]y a third party;" and 5) that Employee suffered
damages that were "caused by the [Supervisor's] interference." 332 The appel-
late court said the appeal turned on whether Supervisor was a "third party"
under the circumstances.333 The appellate court also said the general rule is
that an employee's action against a supervisor/co-employee for tortious inter-
ference will not lie because the supervisor/co-employee is not considered a
third party but rather "'is considered a party to the employment relation-
ship."' 34 However, there is an exception, and the third party requirement is
satisfied if it is alleged that the supervisor/co-employee "was not acting on
the employer's behalf or was acting to its detriment. "335 The court explained
that "an allegation" of "malicious motivation" does not automatically mean
that the co-employee is acting beyond the scope of employment. 336 "'How-
ever, the privileged interference enjoyed by a party ... to [a] business rela-
tionship is not absolute. The privilege is divested when [a party to the rela-
tionship] 'acts solely with ulterior purposes and . .. not in the principal's best
interest."' 3 37 In this case, "the allegation that [Supervisor] acted with the sole
ulterior purpose" of causing Employee's job to be terminated-thus not act-
ing on the employer's behalf-kept Employee's complaint from being dis-
missed.3
C. Negligent Misrepresentation v. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Specialty Marine & Industrial Supplies (Purchaser) was considering en-
tering into a contract with Venus (Seller) and others to purchase certain real
estate.339 Purchaser learned of a boundary dispute concerning the property,
but when questioned, Seller assured Purchaser that the boundary issue "was
'not a big deal' and that there was a survey [to] support[] [Seller's] posi-
tion." 34 0 The contract was signed, and Purchaser hired a surveyor who con-
332. Id.
333. Alexis, 66 So. 3d at 987.
334. Id. at 988 (quoting Rudnick v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 358 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206
(S.D. Fla. 2005)).
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 988 (quoting O.E. Smith's Sons, Inc. v. George, 545 So. 2d 298, 299 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
338. Alexis, 66 So. 3d at 988.
339. Specialty Marine & Indus. Supplies, Inc. v. Venus, 66 So. 3d 306, 308 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2011).
340. Id.
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firmed Seller's statement about the property's boundary.341 The deal closed
for $450,000, but it turned out that the property boundary was in fact not as
represented and the actual boundary made the property unsuitable for use by
Purchaser for the purpose intended.3 2 Purchaser sued Seller for damages,
alleging among other things, that Seller was liable for its negligent misrepre-
sentation of the property boundary.343 The jury, on a comparative negligence
basis, found that Seller was the cause of ninety percent of Purchaser's dam-
ages and awarded Purchaser $360,000, that is, the cause of ninety percent of
the $400,000 claimed damages. 34 The trial court ruled for Seller on its mo-
tion for judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict.345 Purchaser appealed,
Seller cross-appealed, and the First District Court of Appeal reversed in
part, reinstating the jury verdict in favor of Purchaser and ruling that Pur-
chaser was entitled to an award of prejudgment interest.3 47 The First District
Court of Appeal discussed the differences between negligent misrepresenta-
tion alleged by Purchaser and fraudulent misrepresentation.34 8 With respect
to negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must allege that:
"1) the defendant made a misrepresentation of material fact that he
believed to be true but which was in fact false; 2) the defendant
was negligent in making the statement because he should have
known the representation was false; 3) the defendant intended to
induce the plaintiff to rely and [sic] on the misrepresentation; and
4) injury resulted to the plaintiff acting in justifiable reliance upon
the misrepresentation." 349
On the other hand, a fraudulent misrepresentation claim will be sustained
only if the plaintiff can show: "1) a false statement concerning a material
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. Purchaser also sued the surveyor for negligence and that claim was settled before
trial. Specialty Marine & Indus. Supplies, Inc., 66 So. 3d at 308.
344. Id. at 308, 311.
345. Id. at 309.
346. Id. at 307. There was an award to Purchaser on another ground, a ground not raised
by Purchaser. Id. at 309. The trial court awarded Purchaser damages of $35,000 for breach of
warranty, but when Purchaser asked for prejudgment interest on this award, the trial court said
no. Specialty Marine & Indus. Supplies, Inc., 66 So. 3d at 309. The cross-appeal of the
breach of warranty holding was apparently one of "[tihe remaining issues raised on appeal and
cross-appeal [that was] rendered moot by [the court's] reversal of the judgment under review."
See id. at 312.
347. See id. at 309-10.
348. Id. at 309.
349. Id. (quoting Simon v. Celebration Co., 883 So. 2d 826, 832 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2004)).
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fact; 2) the representor's [sic] knowledge that the representation is false; 3)
an intention that the representation induce another to act on it; and 4) conse-
quent injury by the party acting in reliance on the representation."350 An
important difference between negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent
misrepresentation is that the former requires proof of justifiable reliance
while the latter does not.35 ' The trial court found that Purchaser did not justi-
fiably rely on Seller's reliance, thus improperly usurping the jury findings
and verdict to the contrary, which were sustained by competent substantial
evidence. 35 2 Even though the surveyor was also at fault, "there [was] no re-
quirement that [Purchaser's] reliance on [Seller's] misrepresentations be the
sole or even the predominant cause of [Purchaser's] decision to purchase the
property" as long as the "'reliance [was] a substantial factor in determining
the course of conduct that result[ed] in [Purchaser's] loss.' 35 3 Comparative
negligence applies to claims of negligent misrepresentation, and the element
of justifiable reliance does not, under Florida law, fail as a matter of law, just
because, as argued by Seller, Purchaser undertakes an investigation.354
D. Waiver of Liability and Indemnification for Claim of Minor Child
A mother (Mother) took her thirteen-year-old daughter (Daughter), to a
boutique (Defendant) to have Daughter's ears pierced.355 As part of the pro-
cedure, Mother signed "a release from liability" on behalf of herself and her
minor Daughter and agreed to indemnify Defendant and its employees from
,,156AfethprcdrDutrliability for "negligent acts or omissions. After the procedure, Daughter
developed an infection in one ear that "required hospitalization and extensive
medical treatment" and resulted in permanent damage.357 Mother, as parent
and natural guardian of her child, sued Defendant for negligence resulting in
a jury verdict and judgment amount of $69,740.31' Defendant, nevertheless,
then obtained a judgment from the trial court against Mother individually,
350. Specialty Marine & Indus. Supplies, Inc., 66 So. 3d at 310 (emphasis omitted) (quot-
ing Butler v. Yusem, 44 So. 3d 102, 105 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam)); Johnson v. Davis, 480 So.
2d 625, 627 (Fla. 1985)).
351. Specialty Marine & Indus. Supplies, Inc., 66 So. 3d at 310.
352. Id.at310-11.
353. Id. at 311 (quoting Stev-Mar, Inc. v. Matvejs, 678 So. 2d 834, 838 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1996)).
354. Id.at310-11.
355. Claire's Boutiques, Inc. v. Locastro, 36 Fla. L. Weekly 31001, 31001 (4th Dist. Ct.
App. May 11, 2011).
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
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"but not in her capacity as [Daughter's] mother," that was based on the re-
lease of liability/indemnity agreement for more than $200,000, which in-
cluded Defendant's attorney fees and the judgment against it.359 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal upheld the judgment against Defendant for negli-
gence, but reversed the judgment against Mother on the indemnification
claim.3so The appellate court, based on the rationale of Kirton v. Fields,3 6 1
ruled the release of liability/indemnification agreement to be in violation of
public policy. 36 2 In Kirton, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that
public policy prevented the enforcement of a pre-injury release executed by a
minor's parents on behalf of the minor, for a tort arising from the minor's
injuries suffered while participating in a commercial activity. 36 3 The court
found that there was even more reason in this case to cite public policy con-
cerns 3  and quoted Johnson ex rel. Estate of Gillespie v. New River Scenic
Whitewater Tours, Inc. :365 '"[A]llowing a parent to indemnify a third party
for its tortious conduct towards the parent's minor child would result in a
serious affront to the doctrine of parental immunity."' 36 6 The Fourth District
Court of Appeal held that indemnification agreements by a guardian create a
conflict between parent and child.367 Quoting the Court of Appeals of New
York in Valdimer ex rel. Valdimer v. Mount Vernon Hebrew Camps, Inc.,368
the Fourth District Court of Appeal said "'[c]learly, a parent who has placed
himself in the position of indemnitor will be a dubious champion of his in-
fant child's rights."' 369 Judge Levine concurred as to the affirmance on the
negligence award, but dissented on the indemnification issue.370
359. Id.
360. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 36 Fla. L. Weekly at D1003.
361. 997 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2008).
362. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 36 Fla. L. Weekly at D1002-03 (citing Kirton v. Fields, 997
So. 2d 349, 357-58 (Fla. 2008).
363. Kirton, 997 So. 2d at 358.
364. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 36 Fla. L. Weekly at D1002-03.
365. 313 F. Supp. 2d 621 (S.D. W. Va. 2004).
366. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 36 Fla. L. Weekly at D1002 (alteration in original) (quoting
Johnson ex rel. Estate of Gillespie, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 632).
367. See id. at D1003 (citing Childress ex rel. Childress v. Madison Cnty., 777 S.W.2d 1,
7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)).
368. 172 N.E.2d 283 (N.Y. 1961).
369. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 36 Fla. L. Weekly at D1003 (quoting Valdimer ex rel. Val-
dimer, 172 N.E.2d at 285).
370. Id. (Levine, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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E. Respondeat Superior
Mr. Graf (Employee) worked as a driver for a limousine service (Em-
ployer). 7 On the date in question, Employee drove his car to work, parked
it on a ramp outside the business office while he went inside to turn in his
paperwork for the day, but left his keys in the ignition.372 A thief stole Em-
ployee's car, and while driving the car, injured Mr. Allan (Plaintiff) in an
auto accident.373 Plaintiff sued Employee for negligence and also sued Em-
ployer under the theory of respondeat superior.374 Employer prevailed on a
motion for summary judgment. 375 The Fourth District Court of Appeal af-
firmed.376 The appellate court held that Employer could not be held vica-
riously liable for Employee's negligence in leaving keys in the ignition of his
own car.377 Although the car owner, that is Employee, could be held respon-
sible, the court refused to extend the law to cover the owner's employer.378
Xm. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND DEBTOR/CREDITOR RIGHTS
A. Prejudgment Writ of Replevin
PNCEF, LLC v. South Aviation, Inc.7 is a prejudgment writ of replevin
case under section 78.055 of the Florida Statutes.380 The underlying action
was brought by PNCEF, LLC (Lender) against the borrowers (Borrowers) in
Illinois to recover a certain aircraft.38 ' Borrowers responded by alleging that
the aircraft had been leased to a Florida lessee (Lessee), and the aircraft was
located in Broward County.3 82 In addition, Borrowers alleged that "[L]essee
[had] filed liens against the aircraft and [was] refus[ing] to return the aircraft
because of the liens."383 Lender then sued Lessee in Broward County for
replevin seeking a prejudgment writ of replevin. 384 Lessee raised several
371. Allan v. Graf, 43 So. 3d 151, 152 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Allan, 43 So. 3d at 152.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 153.
379. 60 So. 3d 1120 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
380. Id. at 1121; FLA. STAT. § 78.055 (2011).
381. PNCEF, LL.C., 60 So. 3d at 1121.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. The verified complaint contained allegations of conversion and sought injunctive
relief. Id.
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defenses, including lack of jurisdiction over three of the aircrafts because of
their absence from Broward County during all or part of the day that Lender
filed its verified complaint, and that since Illinois had already asserted its
jurisdiction over the aircraft, it was improper for the Florida court to also
exercise jurisdiction over the planes.3"' The Fourth District Court of Appeal
held that none of these alleged jurisdictional issues would constitute an im-
pediment to the issuance of a writ of replevin as long as the court had in per-
sonam jurisdiction over the possessor or person entitled to possession of the
item to be replevied, that is, Lessee.386 Having in personam jurisdiction gave
the court the authority to order the possessor to return the item to Florida.387
However, the appellate court noted that the lower court could not issue fur-
ther orders that act directly on the aircraft until its physical location in Flori-
da was confirmed.8
B. Sale of Collateral
Southern Developers & Earthmoving, Inc. v. Caterpillar Financial Ser-
vices Corp.389 addresses the necessity and methods of proving the "commer-
cial reasonableness" of the sale of collateral by the lender in order to obtain a
deficiency judgment against the defaulting debtor on the debtor's promissory
note under section 679.610(2) of the Florida Statutes.3 90 If the debtor raises
the issue of commercial reasonableness, then the secured party must show
"that every aspect of [the] disposition was commercially reasonable." 391 if
the debtor can prove that the "sale of [its] collateral [was] commercially un-
reasonable, a presumption arises that 'the fair market value of the collateral
at the time of repossession was equal to the [full] amount of the . .. debt."' 39
2
C. Possessory Lien
The next case deals with a possessory lien under section 713.58 of the
Florida Statutes.393 Commercial Jet, Inc. (Commercial) made repairs and did
385. PNCEF, LL.C., 60 So. 3d at 1122.
386. Id. at 1125.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. 56 So. 3d 56 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
390. Id. at 60; FLA. STAT. § 679.610(2) (2011).
391. S. Developers & Earthmoving, Inc., 56 So. 3d at 60 (citing Weiner v. Am. Petrofina
Mktg., Inc., 482 So. 2d 1362, 1364-65 (Fla. 1986).
392. Id. at 61 (quoting Weiner, 482 So. 2d at 1365).
393. Commercial Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 45 So. 3d 887, 887 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2010), review granted, 61 So. 3d 410 (Fla. 2011); FLA. STAT. § 713.58(3) (2011).
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maintenance work on a jet owned by U.S. Bank, N.A. (Owner) and operated
by Silver Jet.394 However, before Commercial had been paid the balance
claimed to be due,395 Commercial returned the airplane to Silver Jet.396
Commercial recorded a claim of lien-under both section 713.58 and section
329.51 of the Florida Statutes-and brought suit to foreclose its purported
lien.397 Owner moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Commer-
cial did not have possession of the plane when it filed its claim of lien.
Owner successfully argued that the claim to a section 713.58 lien was lost
when possession was given up. 39 9 Commercial contended that section 329.51
amended section 713.58 and that a valid lien could "be created simply by
recording a claim of lien within ninety days" after the services are pro-
vided.40 The Third District Court of Appeal rejected Commercial's argu-
ment and concluded that section 329.51 was only "a notice statute" and
"[did] not create any new lien rights."40 1 Judge Schwartz dissented, conclud-
ing that section 329.51, which deals with repairs to aircraft, was more than a
notice statute.402
D. Right of Set-Off
BankAtlantic v. Estate of Glatzer40 3 presented an unusual issue. Dr.
Glatzer's 100% owned professional association (Borrower) owed BankAt-
lantic (Bank) money as evidenced by a promissory note and mortgage. 404 Dr.
Glatzer (Decedent) guaranteed the debt.405 In addition to the note, mortgage,
and Decedent's personal guarantee, the promissory note contained "a right of
setoff' that allowed Bank to collect its debt by taking funds from-and even
freezing-any accounts that Borrower maintained at Bank.4 06 Decedent died,
and his death was "an event of default under [the] note." 40 7 Borrower's ac-
count at Bank apparently was not frozen by Bank at the time of, or after De-
394. Commercial Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 887-88.
395. See id. at 887. The opinion does not indicate if Owner or Silver Jet contested that
there were monies due, or the amount thereof. Id. at 887-88.
396. Id. at 887.
397. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 713.58(3); Id. § 329.51(2009).
398. Commercial Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 888.
399. Id.; § 713.58(3) (2011).
400. Commercial Jet, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 888.
401. Id. (construing FLA. STAT. § 329.51 (2009)).
402. See id. at 889 (Schwartz, J., dissenting) (construing FLA. STAT. § 329.51).
403. 61 So. 3d 1222 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
404. Id. at 1222.
405. Id. at 1223.
406. Id. at 1222-23.
407. Id. at 1223.
74 [Vol. 36
40
Nova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss1/3
FLORIDA LAW AFFECTING BUSINESS OWNERS
cedent's death, and the personal representative of Decedent's estate obtained
probate court orders allowing the transfer by the personal representative of
funds in Borrower's accounts to an estate depository account. 408 Bank ap-
pealed, and the Third District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded.40
Bank's "possessory and contractual rights to set-off [were] impaired" when
funds were transferred to the estate depository account at another bank.410
Decedent's stock was an estate asset, but Borrower's bank accounts, being
assets of the corporate Borrower, were "a step removed from the Estate."''
The Third District Court of Appeal concluded that the estate "essentially
ignored the separate corporate existence of the professional association and
that entity's obligations to its own creditors."412
E. Re-recording of Judgment (Debtor-Creditor)
The holding in Sun Glow Construction, Inc. v. Cypress Recovery
Corp. 4 1 3 is straightforward and to the point. The Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal held "that the re-recording of a certified copy of a judgment after the
expiration of the original judgment lien imposes a new lien on real property
held by the judgment debtor" even though "[t]he statute is silent" on the is-
sue.4 14 The holding applies when the judgment creditor fails to affect an ex-
tension of the judgment lien under section 55.10(1) of the Florida Statutes
prior to the expiration of the lien. 415 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
quoted the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Franklin Financial,
Inc. v. White,4 16 saying "'[1]ike a child that wanders out of a queue, the newly
rerecorded judgment lien has lost its place and must go to the back and stand
behind all previously recorded judgment liens.' 4 17
F. Garnishment
Caproc Third Avenue, LLC (Judgment Creditor) obtained a writ of gar-
nishment against Donisi Insurance's (Judgment Debtor's) account with Bank
408. See Estate of Glatzer, 61 So. 3d at 1222-23.
409. Id. at 1223.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. 47 So. 3d 371 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
414. Id. at 372-74.
415. FLA. STAT. § 55.10(1) (2011); Sun Glow Constr., Inc., 47 So. 3d at 372, 374.
416. 932 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
417. Sun Glow Constr., Inc., 47 So. 3d at 373 (quoting Franklin Fin., Inc., 932 So. 2d at
437).
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of America.4 18 Judgment Debtor moved to have the writ dissolved and filed
an affidavit claiming the "wages exception" exemption under section 222.12
of the Florida Statutes from garnishment.419 Judgment Creditor's attorney
filed an affidavit in the proceedings contesting Judgment Debtor's claimed
wages exemption.420 The trial court dissolved the writ finding the attorney's
affidavit insufficient.42 1 Judgment Creditor appealed, and the Fourth District
Court of Appeal affirmed.422 Section 222.12 of the Florida Statutes requires
that the affidavit in opposition be made "by the party who sued out the
process."423 An affidavit by the attorney for that party does not qualify. 42 4
On the other hand, in the next case-which came before the Second
District Court of Appeal on a motion for summary judgment and which the
appellate court reversed, finding that there was a genuine issue of material
fact unresolved-the issue was how much the garnishee, Cortez Community
Bank, owed the garnishor pursuant to four writs of garnishment served on the
bank on October 2, 2008.425 On the same date, the bank filed responses to
the writ in letter form, and the letters were signed by the bank's senior vice
president and chief operating officer.426 It was not until more than four
months later, on February 12, 2009, that the bank's counsel filed answers to
the writs. 427 Section 77.06(1) of the Florida Statutes states that "[s]ervice of
the writ shall make garnishee liable for all debts due by him or her to defen-
dant . . . at the time of the service of the writ or at any time between the ser-
vice and the time of the garnishee's answer." 42 8 The writ response letters
filed by the bank's senior vice president and chief operating officer were
ignored because a corporation cannot represent itself pro se.4 29 Therefore,
the amount owed by the garnishee bank was calculated with liability to the
date the bank's counsel filed answers-February 12, 2009.430
418. Caproc Third Ave., L.L.C. v. Donisi Ins., Inc., 67 So. 3d 312, 312(4th Dist. Ct. App.
2011).
419. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 222.12.
420. Caproc Third Ave., LLC., 67 So. 3d at 313.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 315.
423. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 222.12).
424. Id.
425. Cortez Cmty. Bank v. Cobb, 56 So. 3d 80, 81(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. FLA. STAT. § 77.06(1).
429. Cobb, 56 So. 3d at 81 (citing Nicholson Supply Co. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
of Hardee Cnty., 184 So. 2d 438, 440 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966)).
430. Id.
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In another garnishment case, Baker v. Storfer,43 1 the issue was whether
or not commissions paid by an employer to "a commissioned employee"
constituted "salary or wages" for purposes of the garnishment statute-
section 77.0305 of the Florida Statutes. 43 2 The Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal ruled "that commissions are 'wages,' for purposes of section
77.0305."43
XIV. CONCLUSION
Hundreds of Florida appellate opinions issued in the past year might be
said to affect the conduct of business by Florida business owners. Of course,
this survey deals only with some of those cases. It is not surprising, howev-
er, that after several years of difficult economic times, there was a plethora of
breach of contract, mortgage foreclosure, and other debtor creditor decisions
rendered by Florida's appellate courts in the past year. Therefore, a greater
number of such decisions were included in this year's survey than in prior
years. That, however, should not detract from the other significant appellate
decisions in the past year that continued to clarify and refine Florida law in
many areas affecting business owners, as reflected in this year's survey. One
particularly important area in which there were substantial developments
over the prior few years, as well as in the past year, involves the enforceabili-
ty of releases signed by parents on behalf of their minor children. Another
involves the question of when a Florida court may properly exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident whose contacts with Florida are, in whole or
in part, through the Internet. While important guidance has been provided in
both of these areas, numerous questions remain, and undoubtedly additional
guidance will be forthcoming.
431. 51 So. 3d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam).
432. Id. at 652; see FLA. STAT. § 77.0305.
433. Baker, 51 So. 3d at 653; see FLA. STAT. § 77.0305.
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